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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
The rules of liability in cases where the corporation is dissolved
before the expiration of its stated chartered existence seem fair
and logical. However, there seems no real reason for allowing a
corporation to make a lease which must extend beyond the period
of its corporate existence. Such a lease is sure to cause compli-
cations when the charter expires. If it is not assigned to a suc-
cessor corporation, there will surely be a dispute over the correct
determination of the amount of the damages, since this involves
the prior determination of the highly speculative problem of the
amount for which the premises can be rented to some other tenant
for the balance of the term. If the leasehold interest is assigned,
the landlord may find that he now has an irresponsible tenant in
place of the thoroughly solvent corporation with which he
originally contracted. Moreover, it would seem that such leases
are contrary to the fundamental public policy expressed in the
requirement that the corporation have a definitely limited life
span. GEORGE W. SIMPKINS, '33.
AIRPLANES AS COMMON CARRIERS
The mechanics of air carriage are of very recent origin. Its
present efficiency, more quickly developed than that of other car-
riers, has been greatly aided by the modern tendency towards en-
couragement of new inventions and industries. In the ordinary
development of new instruments of general public usage, the
creation of new mechanical problems usually results in new legal
thought. In connection with carriage by air, new legal thought
has scarcely begun to develop. The advent of the airplane as a
mode of conveyance has not caused a departure or modification of
the principles of the law of carriers as heretofore established and
applied by the courts. The airplane is regarded as merely a
modern method of transportation to which the settled rules can
extend.' These rules have classified carriers into two types: the
private or ordinary carrier; and the public or common carrier.
They have their origin in an early period of English history when
conditions of traveling were undeveloped and when public need
I In Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc. (D. C. Pa. 1931) 1931
U. S. Av. Rep. 205, the trial judge said "These rules were laid down before
airplanes were known, and were intended originally to apply to railroad
transportation and transportation even earlier than that by stage coach, so
when you come to determine what is the highest degree of practicable care
and diligence you will have to remember that in dealing with travel by air-
plane you are dealing with a new kind of transportation which is now navi-
gating a new element. There are many more factors which are unknown,
unforeseeable, and not preventable arising in connection with an airplane
journey than with a railroad journey."
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for protection in traveling caused the courts to impose greater
liabilities upon certain types of carriers. As the stagecoach was
superseded by the railroad this distinction of liability was ex-
tended since the same basis for its application existed. The classi-
fication has been extended to every new means of carriage which
the courts felt could be brought under its distinctions.
The private carrier is subjected to only the ordinary rules of
liability for acts of omission or commission, but the common car-
rier is subjected to these rules and more "because one who entrusts
his property [or person] to the carrier is in the nature of the case
so helpless to protect himself against the negligence or fraud of
the carrier."2 The difficulty lies in ascertaining when a carrier
falls into either class. The general test is that "to constitute a
common carrier there must be a dedication of property to public
use of such character that the product and service are available
to the public generally and indiscriminately, and that the carrier
must hold himself ready to serve the public indifferently to the
limit of his capacity." 3 Under this general rule, the large trans-
continental transport air carriers who sell tickets generally to the
public, maintain a regular schedule, advertise extensively, and
fly publicly known routes, are held as common carriers.4 They
are so held even if they insert in their contracts express provisions
that they are to be liable only as private carriers.5 These limita-
tions have only evidential value. Provisions relieving from all
liability are generally held against public policy and void. Where
the facts of operation indicate to the court that the carrier falls
within the classification of a common carrier given above the car-
rier cannot escape the legal consequences. In this respect there
is similarity between the common carrier by air and other common
carriers.6 The imposition of the common carrier's high degree
of liability upon the carrier by air, when the industry is still in
its early development, has been criticized on the ground that it
will retard the progress of the industry and its future potential
use.7 But it is submitted that this liability may achieve the con-
2 Goddard, Outline of Bailments and Carriers (2nd ed.), sec. 189.
'Hissem v. Guran (1925) 112 Ohio St. 59, 146 N. E. 808.
4 Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc., note 1, supra; Wilson v.
Colonial Air Transport, Inc. (Mun. Ct. Boston, Mass., 1931), 1931 U. S. Av.
Rep. 109; Allison, Admr. v. Standard Air Lines, Inc. (Cal., 1930) 1930 U. S.
Av. Rep. 292; Smith v. O'Donnell (Cal. 1932) 12 P. (2d) 933, 1932 U. S.
Av. Rep. 145.
. Cases cited in note 4, supra. See (1932) 3 Journal of Air Law 662.
6 Buckley v. Bangor and A. R. Co. (1915) 113 Me. 164, 93 Atl. 65; Doyle
v. Fitchburg R. Co. (1896) 166 Mass. 492, 44 N. E. 611; Bank of Kentucky
v. Adams (1876) 93 U. S. 174.
7 John F. O'Ryan, Limitation of Aircraft Liability (1932) 3 Air Law Re-
view 27.
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trary result by causing a greater amount of efficiency and safety
to be employed, thus being conducive to the general betterment of
the industry. In general, the courts in dealing with the airplane
carrier have adhered to the age old classification of carriers and
their respective liabilities.
To determine whether other carriers are common carriers
courts consider the extent and scope of their business. An im-
portant factor is whether the carrier is engaged in the business
of transportation as a regular vocation. In the case of Smith v.
O'Donnell8 the carrier did not have regular routes, but merely
took passengers up for a few minutes and then returned to the
starting point. He maintained a regular place of business and
had certain fixed prices. The plaintiff came to the defendant's
airport not to take a ride, but to solicit business from the defend-
ant. He accepted the ride gratuitously. In a suit to recover
damages for an accident that occurred the defendant was held as
a common carrier. The court cited two earlier cases, North At-
lantic Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pitts,9 and Brown v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins.
Co.,1o which arose out of similar facts. In them the pilot did not
operate on a schedule, took up only white persons, did not operate
at a fixed establishment, and did not take baggage. Each passen-
ger was carried up for a few minutes' ride by special arrangement.
In suits to recover on insurance policies in which the amounts of
the indemnities turned upon whether the insured was injured
while on a common carrier, the carrier was held not to be a com-
mon carrier. These cases were distinguished from the principal
case on the ground that the carrier in the principal case main-
tained a regular place of business and that a statute of California
defining common carriers was broad enough to include this car-
rier's activities. 1 Maintenance of a regular business establish-
ment is a traditional test for determining the carrier's status.12
Smith v. O'Donnell proceeds farther in that it presents the issue
whether a common carrier may lose his character as such under
special arrangements resulting from a private agreement rather
than from the holding out generally to the public. The liability
of other common carriers can be controlled by special agreement
" See note 4, supra. Also notes in (1932) 3 Journal of Air Law 463 and
(1932) 21 Cal. L. Rev. 70.
9 (1925) 213 Ala. 102, 104 S. 21, 1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 178.
2o(C. C. A. 5, 1925) 8 F. (2d) 996, 1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 178. See (1930)
1 Air Law Review 409.
112 R. C. Cal. (1929) Section 2168: "Everyone who offers to the public to
carry persons, property, or messages, excepting only telegraphic messages,
is a common carrier of whatever he thus offers to carry."
12 Stevenson & Co. Inc., v. Hartman (1921) 231 N. Y. 378, 132 N. E. 121,
and see annotation in 18 A. L. R. 1323.
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affecting the nature of the service, if not contrary to public pol-
icy.13 This freedom of contract should be open to the common
carrier by air. The definition of a common carrier is one of law,
but whether the particular act is one of a common carrier is a
question of fact. Where the airplane carrier offers carriage
merely for convenience or as a temporary service, the question
whether he is a common carrier is at least one for the jury to
determine.
Cases which consider the airplane carrier as a common carrier
are becoming more numerous as the mode of carriage has in-
creased in use. In each instance the issues are chiefly factual, so
that an extensive citation of cases would be useful only so far as
precedents for some factual situations. Obviously, there are air
carriers whose classification is apparent; but in the main the
courts are confronted with carriers whose activities are in the
peripheral zones of both private and common carriers. 4 Sug-
gestive criteria for determining if the status of a common carrier
exists are: (1) the good faith of the carrier in question, under
which would be a limitation upon the carrier to deny the liability
and duties which should attach to the maintained status of the
carrier; (2) the scope and usage of the carrier as a regular as
distinct from a mere temporary activity; (3) proportionate as-
sumed field of carriage rather than the number of contracts; (4)
manner of holding out rather than the numbers of passengers car-
ried; and (5), the nature of the carrier's business and character
of contracts under which the operations are carried.' 5
Unlike accidents that occur on land or sea, the accidents that oc-
cur in the air leave few traces. In the majority of cases, the
actual existence of negligence is practically impossible to prove or
disprove. The question is presented whether the traditional
13 Bates v. Old Colony R. Co. (1888) 147 Mass. 255, 17 N. E. 633; Blank v.
Ill. R. Co. (1899) 182 Ill. 332, 55 N. E. 332. In McCusker v. Curtiss-Wright
Flying Service, Inc. (Ill., 1932) 1932 U. S. Av. Rep. 100, although the plane
was chartered specially for a trip, the court instructed as to the common car-
rier position of the defendant. Judgment was for the plaintiff.
14 Cases presenting the use of the airplane for special purposes are obvious-
ly more difficult for classification. In State ex. rel. Beall v. McLeod (Md.
1932) 1932 U. S. Av. Rep. 94, where the operator carried passengers for
sightseeing trips, taking off and landing on the same field, and who accepted
no objectionable passengers, the defendant was held as a common carrier.
See also Hagymasi, Admr. v. Colonial Airways, Inc. (N. J. 1931) 1931 U. S.
Av. Rep. 73. However, in Conklin v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc. (N. J.
1930) 1930 U. S. Av. Rep. 188, where the plane was used for the purposes of
advertising a resort and taking up passengers for sightseeing, the court held
the defendant not to be a common carrier.
15 Cannon, What Constitutes a Common Carrier? (1931) 15 Marquette L.
Rev. 67.
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rules of negligence that have been applied to the other common
carriers are fitting and proper to determine the negligence of
common carriers by air. The influences of concern both for those
who travel by air and for the welfare of the industry itself is il-
lustrated in the case of Berg v. Seitz.16 The court says, "The
nature of the conveyance and the great danger involved would
seem to require the utmost practical care and prudence for the
safety of the passenger." This statement does not, nor did the
court intend to make, a distinction between private and common
carrier in the degree of care involved, if the plaintiff was in fact a
passenger. The view considers the practical and inherent diffi-
culty of distinguishing the degrees of care in an instrumentality
like the airplane where in flight any lack of care proves disastrous.
This is an excellent illustration of the creation of new legal
thought adapted to the situation presented by a new mechanism.
Where certain regulations have been made by governmental
authorities for the purpose of mechanical fitness, the issue arises
as to the probative effect of proof of a non-compliance with a regu-
lation. Owing to the inherent dangerousness of the instrumen-
tality it would seem that all regulations of this type should be
strictly adhered to by the carrier and that a non-compliance should
be prima facie evidence of negligence. 'In this respect no distinc-
tion should be made between private or common carrier. In
Hagymasi, Administrator, v. Colonial Airways Inc.,17 it was held
that the failure of a pilot to comply with statutory requirements
as to license, inspection, and capacity of the aircraft, was not
negligence per se, but a factor to be considered to determine
whether negligence of the carrier was the proximate cause of the
disaster.18 The mere issuance of the pilot license should not be
considered as conclusive of the fitness of the pilot since it may be
disproved at the particular instance by drunkenness or other
physical disqualifications. In all cases the particular failure to
comply with any requirement made to promote safety and care
should have a proximate causal connection with the injury in
order to be actionable.
When it is said that the carrier owes the passenger the highest
degree of care and diligence, "the terms in question do not mean
all the care and diligence the human mind can conceive, nor such
as will render the transportation free from all possible peril, nor
such as would drive the carrier from his business."'19 This state-
ment indicates that the degree of care required of the common car-
16 (Kan. 1931) 1931 U. S. Av. Rep. 111.
17 See note 14, supra. Noted in (1931) 2 Air Law Review 402.
Is Also State ex rel. Beall v. McLeod, note 14, supra; and Law v. Trans-
continental Air Transport, Inc., note 1, supra.
2 Indianapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Horst (1876) 93 U. S. 291.
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rier by air is no different from that required of other common car-
riers. 20 In determining negligence of other common carriers the
res ipsa, loquitur doctrine, "the thing speaks for itself," has been
applied. Its use in cases of common carriers by air has a greater
significance in its application than other common carrier in-
stances because of the difficulty to prove or disprove facts due to
the entire destructibility of all evidence in most airplane acci-
dents. In McCusker v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc.,21 it
was held that an airplane carrier for hire is not a guarantor or in-
surer of the safety of the passenger, but is required to exercise the
highest degree of care in the management and control of an air-
plane consistent with practical operation; that the burden of
proof is upon the plaintiff to establish negligence by a preponder-
ance of evidence. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is merely an
aid to establish such negligence. The doctrine is held particularly
applicable to common carriers because as said in Housel v. Pacific
Electric Railway,22 "The reason for the application of the doctrine
in such cases appears to be practically as stated in this quotation,
viz.: that in view of the very high degree of care essential under
the law on the part of a carrier of persons towards those who are
its passengers, such a collision would not happen in the ordinary
course of events if the carrier exercise such care, and that ordi-
narily when such an accident occurs, it is due to the failure on the
part of the person operating to use the proper degree of care in so
operating, or in other words to the manner in which the defend-
ant used or directed the instrumentality under his control." The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is purely a rule of evidence, "not a
rule of law, but a statement of what is permissible, not manda-
tory, in a course of reasoning and of drawing inferences ....
A given act bears the badge of carelessness. It causes injury.
Liability follows."' 23 As a rule of evidence, the doctrine is not
only rebuttable, but it cannot be invoked in every airplane acci-
dent. If the plaintiff has affirmative proof of the cause he can-
not invoke this rule. In the case, Law v. Transcontinental Air
20 Foot v. Northwest Airways, Inc. (Minn. 1930) 1931 U. S. Av. Rep. 66;
Hamilton v. O'Toole (Mass. 1927) 1930 U. S. Av. Rep. 133. The courts have
disregarded the distinctions of degrees of care required, and now rule that
the degree of care required must be consistent with the operation, equipment,
maintenance, and adjustment of the plane to guarantee the safety of the
passenger.
21 See note 13, supra.
22 (1914) 167 Cal. 245, 139 Pac. 73.
21 Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., Note 4, supra. See Osterhout,
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied to Aviation (1931) 2 Air Law Re-
view 9, and Harper, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Air Law (1930) 1 Air Law Review
478.
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Transport Co.,24 where plaintiff's intestate as a passenger on the
defendant's plane was killed when the pilot in attempting to avoid
a storm overran the field and struck a field stump, the affirmative
proof thus shown was held to deny the application of the doctrine.
The fact that an airplane motor ceases to function within a few
minutes after taking off was held in Wilson v. Colonial Air Trans-
port, Inc.,2 5 not to be evidence of such a factual situation as to give
rise to a presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. The court felt that until the causes of the failure of air-
plane motors to function are more definitely known, it is rather
premature to say that only lack of ordinary care could have caused
it.26 The doctrine is also not applicable to the cases where the di-
rect cause of the accident, and so much of the surrounding cir-
cumstances as were essential to its occurrence were not within the
sole control of the carrier. This assumes that the passenger on
an airplane common carrier bears the ordinary perils incident to
airplane travel over and above the perils against which the carrier
must, under its legal liability, guard. It is obvious that the
doctrine can be suitably applied to determine the negligence of the
common carrier by air, but its application should be restricted
only to those instances where reasonable inferences of negligence
appear; otherwise, in instances noted, where there is an absence
of any proofs, the doctrine would be conclusive as to the element of
negligence. It would be questionable whether proof by the car-
rier that it took all precautions necessary would be sufficient re-
buttal in the absence of another compelling motive for the oc-
currence. In Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.,27 where res
ipsa loquitur was held applicable as a rule of evidence to aid thejury to pass upon the issue of negligence when the plane crashed
after making a turn, the court stated that the doctrine of vis major
was inapplicable, since there was proof of weather clear of atmos-
pheric disturbances. The application of the doctrine to common
carriers by air has perhaps been the cause of the policy adopted
by the majority of the large transcontinental companies of insur-
ing each passenger and including cost of such insurance in the
price of the ticket.
24 See note 1, supra.
25 See note 4, supra.
26 "There is at present no common knowledge of which courts can take
cognizance concerning the customs or usual practice of air transport com-
panies as to operation, inspection, and repairs of their airplanes. There must
be evidence. We are not as yet, in respect to the operation, care and charac-
teristics of aircraft, in a position where the doctrine of cases like Ware v.
Gay, 11 Pick. 106, as to a stagecoach, O'Neill v. Toomey, 218 Mass. 242, as to
the qualities of ice, or Gilchrist v. Boston Electric Ry., 272 Mass. 346, as to
the trolley car or steam railroad trains, can be applied."
27 (N. Y. 1931) 1931 U. S. Av. Rep. 229.
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In considering the status of passengers, the ordinary rules of
liability that other common carriers owe to passengers would
seem appropriate for application to the common carrier by air.
However, the obligation to serve all, in its application to air car-
riage, should have a liberal interpretation consonant with the con-
ditions pertinent to this type of carriage. Because of the lack of
contact and experience which the public generally has with this
mode of traveling, it is obvious that the carrier by air should have
a wider latitude of discrimination without consequent legal lia-
bility.
The rules applied to other common carriers to establish the re-
lation of carriers and passenger and to determine the duties of
performance are applicable to the common carrier by air. The
passenger status is always the result of a contract, expressed or
implied. 28 The offer to carry is usually the holding out, though
subject to revocation if the carrier is reluctant to have his offer
accepted because of some lack of fitness of the person who wished
to accept. This person must not only have an intention of be-
coming a passenger but must also do some act expressive of that
intent. The expression of the act subjects the common carrier
by air to the same impositions of liability of ingress and egress
to his instrumentality to which other common carriers are sub-
jected. The airport is in legal contemplation similar to the rail-
road depot. The passenger should enter and leave the airport
by the regular entrances. The liabilities attaching to ingress
and egress are limited to the scope of the activities undertaken
between the passenger and the airplane carrier. These activi-
ties have been held broad enough to include what is ordinarily
incident to an airplane trip and especially the passenger's
presence or movements in or near to the machine incidental to be-
ginning or concluding the trip.29 The very recent cases of
Williamson v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc.,30 and Berg v.
Seitz31 hold the carrier liable for injuries resulting to the passen-
28 Weber v. Chicago & Alton R. Co. (1915) 175 Iowa 358, 151 N. W. 852;
Todd, Admx. v. L. & N. R. Co. (1916) 274 Ill. 201, 113 N. E.
An analogous problem of determining the scope of the aeronautical
activity arises in cases concerning insurance liability. In the cases Of
Blonski v. Bankers Life Ins. Co. (Wis. 1932) 243 N. W. 410, 1932 U. S. Av.
Rep. 57, and Pittman v. Lamar Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 5, 1927) 17 F. (2d)
370, 1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 188, the movements incident to the trip were held
to within the terms of the policies; but in Tierney v. Occidental Life Ins. Co.
(1927) 89 Cal. App. 779, 265 Pac. 400,1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 191, the movements
of leaving the plane after a trip were not held to be a phase of aeronautical
activity.
3o (Tex. 1932) 51 S. W. (2d) 1047. Noted in (1933) 4 Journal of Air Law
113.
31 See note 16, supra.
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ger after concluding a trip because of the failure of the common
carrier to provide safe egress. In the Williamson case, the plane,
after a regularly routed trip, landed facing the wrong way, thus
requiring the passengers to pass around the plane in order to
reach the company's office, rest room, and passenger exit. In
passing around the plane the passenger was struck by the whirl-
ing propeller and received serious injuries. The case was pre-
sented to the jury on special issues. The carrier was found
guilty of negligence in not putting a guard around the propeller,
or in furnishing a guide to the passenger to conduct him to the
hangar. The jury also found specially that the passenger was
not guilty of contributory negligence.3 2 The verdict in favor of
the plaintiff was sustained by the court on the ground that there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to reach its findings. The
issue of contributory negligence in this case presents a situation
similar to that pertaining to railroads whose station is so placed
as to require passengers to cross tracks in order to go to or come
from the station. While the passenger may reasonably assume
that the tracks are clear, he must exercise a reasonable amount of
precaution; and if he fail to exercise this his contributory acts
will generally bar recovery.3 3 As in the principal case the issue
is determined by the jury. In Berg v. Seitz the plane was used
for amusement and exhibition purposes. The plaintiff was in-
jured by the propeller while passing around the plane to the exit.
The defendant was held guilty of negligence in failing to warn
the plaintiff. The court held that the high degree of care ap-
plied to common carriers would be applicable to private carriers
of passengers by air in carriage and the incidents of carriage.
Whether the high degree of care required in carriage will be re-
quired outside of the immediate incidents of carriage will depend
upon the jurisdiction in which the case arises, for there is a sharp
conflict among the courts. It is a safe prediction that the same
degree which a particular court imposes on other common car-
riers as to station grounds will be extended to the common carrier
by air as to its airport grounds. The weight of authority as to
other common carriers seems to be that as to station buildings
and other appurtenances, only ordinary or reasonable care is re-
quired.34 As to these grounds the common carrier is treated as
32 In Hough, Admx. v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc. (Me. 1929) 1929
U. S. Av. Rep. 99, concerning facts similar to the Williamson case, the de-
fense of contributory negligence was sustained. The application of the de-
fense is mainly factual; but courts should consider the effects of air carriage
upon those not accustomed to this mode of traveling.
.33 Youngerman v. N. Y. etc. R. Co. (1916) 223 Mass. 29, 111 N. E. 607;
Graven v. McLeod (C. C. A. 6, 1899) 92 Fed. 846.
34 Kelley v. Manhattan R. Co. (1889) 112 N. Y. 443, 20 N. E. 383; Falls v.
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an ordinary owner of property with the burden of care consistent
with the danger. The minority rule applies the same degree of
care required in the carriage of passengers to the ownership of
all property incident to the carriage even outside the immediate
mechanical operations of the instrumentality. 35
Courts reflect current trends in the application of rules. The
prevailing feeling that the air industry should not be saddled with
the aged theories and principles of laws of the ground common
carriers will receive more deliberation as new problems create
new phases for the application of these rules. Though the public
policy of affording legal redress and protection for those who
travel by air may conflict with the public interest centered in the
progress of the air industry, the courts should realize that present
conditions of aerial travel and transportation demand that lia-
bility be limited in the interest of the community itself so that the
greatest benefits of the instrumentality may be obtained. Ex-
tensions of the future use of the airplane with a corresponding
growth of its business will be influenced by the weight of legal
thought and application of rules.
LOUIS SHANFELD, '33.
S. F. & N. P. R. Co. (1893) 97 Cal. 114, 31 P. 901; McCormick v. Detroit, etc.
R. Co. (1905) 141 Mich. 17, 104 N. E. 390. See note 10 A. L. R. 259.
:15 Knight v. Portland S. & P. R. Co. (1868) 56 Me. 234, 96 Am. Dec. 449;
Fremont E. & M. R. Co. v. Hoghblad (1904) 72 Neb. 773, 101 N. W. 1041;
Brackett v. S. R. Co. (1911) 88 S. C. 447, 70 S. E. 1026.
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